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Abstract This paper considers a zero-sum two-player asymmetric information stochas-
tic game where only one player knows the system state, and the transition law is con-
trolled by the informed player only. For the informed player, it has been shown that
the security strategy only depends on the belief and the current stage. We provide LP
formulations whose size is only linear in the size of the uninformed player’s action
set to compute both history based and belief based security strategies. For the unin-
formed player, we focus on the regret, the difference between 0 and the future payoff
guaranteed by the uninformed player in every possible state. Regret is a real vector of
the same size as the belief, and depends only on the action of the informed player and
the strategy of the uninformed player. This paper shows that the uninformed player
has a security strategy that only depends on the regret and the current stage. LP for-
mulations are then given to compute the history based security strategy, the regret at
every stage, and the regret based security strategy. The size of the LP formulations
are again linear in the size of the uninformed player action set. Finally, an intrusion
detection problem is studied to demonstrate the main results in this paper.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks have been a serious threat to the security and privacy of individuals (e.g.
Equifax data breach), companies (e.g. HBO cyberattack and Sony Pictures hack), and
nations (e.g. stuxnet), and are reported to spur billions of dollars in loss [2]. Such cy-
ber attacks have become more stealthy, targeted, and sophisticated over the past few
years. One difficulty in modelling and defending against them is that attackers often
have access to a vast amount of attacking measures, which results in lack of complete
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information on the defender’s part. Hence, we propose to model cyber security prob-
lems as games with asymmetric information, and get a systematic strategy to fight
against cyber attacks.
A key element in asymmetric information games is to estimate the private in-
formation of the other players. This element is usually a probability, which is also
called belief, over the other player’s private information based on the history of ob-
servations. Generally speaking, a belief over the other player’s private information
depends on the player’s strategy, which, in turn, depends on the belief. Therefore,
there is always a coupling between the belief and the strategy. To decompose the
coupling, common information based belief and the corresponding strategy were pro-
posed [10–12, 16]. In [11], Bayesian Nash equilibrium was considered. To decouple
the belief from the strategy, it was assumed that the belief was strategy independent.
With this assumption, asymmetric information games can be transformed to a sym-
metric game in which a backward inductionwas derived, and the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium can be found by solving a one-stage Bayesian game. The idea was adopted
in [10] with a focus on zero-sum stochastic games. Both [12] and [16] considered
perfect Bayesian equilibrium which consists of a belief system and a strategy profile.
The belief and the strategy need to be consistent with each other to form a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. In [12, 16], players’ strategies were assumed to be known by
each other. Based on this assumption, Ouyang et.al decomposed a stochastic game
with asymmetric information and used a backward induction to find common infor-
mation based perfect Bayesian equilibrium [12]. Sinha and Anastasopoulos studied
an infinite horizon discounted asymmetric information game in [16], and found that
the common information based belief and strategy are stationary. A methodologywas
developed to decompose the interdependence between the belief and strategy, and to
evaluate structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
While many previous work focused on beliefs in asymmetric information games,
there is another group of works pointing out another key element in asymmetric in-
formation games [3, 14, 18]. This element is a real vector of the same size as the
belief, and does not depend explicitly on the other player’s strategy. We call this vec-
tor ‘regret’, because it is the difference between 0 and the future payoff guaranteed
by a security strategy for every possible initial private information of the other play-
ers [5, 6, 9]. It was shown that the player without private information (uninformed
player) has a security strategy that only depends on the regret in repeated games, plus
the current stage if this is a finite stage game [3].
This paper focuses on asymmetric information zero-sum two-player stochastic
games where only one player (informed) has access to private information (system
state) which evolves following a Markovian rule controlled by the informed player
only. Our goal is to provide tractable conditions for the computation of both play-
ers’ security strategies (to be defined precisely in Section 2) for such games. More
precisely, we show how to obtain LP formulations whose size is only linear in the
cardinality of the uninformed player’s action set, in contrast with existing approaches
which do not consider the uninformed player’s strategy and/or require LPs with size
scaling polynomially in the cardinality of that set [4]. For the informed player, our
approach builds on the work of [13], which showed that the informed player has
a security strategy that only depends on the belief and the current stage, and is in-
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dependent of the action history of the uninformed player. We extend our original
contribution [7] by introducing an algorithm to compute belief based security strat-
egy for the informed player. For the uninformed player, we introduce and build on
the new notion of ‘regret’, which generalizes the similar object we first considered
in the context of repeated games [5]. By using the dual game of the asymmetric in-
formation stochastic game, we show that in finite horizon asymmetric information
stochastic games, the uninformed player has a security strategy that only depends on
the regret and the current stage, and is independent of the history action of the unin-
formed player. The regret only depends on the action history of the informed player,
and is independent of the strategy of the informed player. It is because of this prop-
erty that an appropriately-sized LP can be derived, along with algorithms to compute
the regret at every stage.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game model. Section
3 and 4 introduce the security strategies of informed and uninformed players, respec-
tively, and detail the derivations mentioned above. Finally, in Section 5, we apply our
security strategy computation techniques to a game model of an intrusion detection
problem.
2 Problem statement
Let Rn denote the n-dimensional real space. For a finite set K, |K| denotes its cardi-
nality, and ∆(K) indicates the set of probability distributions over K. The symbols 1
and 0 denote vectors with all elements equal to 1 and 0, respectively. The size will
be implied from context. For a vector p and a matrix Z, we use p(i) to denote the ith
element of p, and Z(i, j) to denote the element at the ith row and jth column of Z.
The ith row and the jth column of Z are denoted as Z(i, :) and Z(:, j), respectively.
A two-player zero-sum stochastic game is specified by a six-tuple (K,A,B,M, p0
,Q), where
– K is a finite set, called the state set, whose elements are the states of the game.
– A and B are the finite action sets of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
– Mk ∈ R
|A|×|B| is the payoff matrix if the state is k ∈ K. Mk(a,b) is player 1’s one
stage payoff, or player 2’s one stage cost if the current state is k and the current
actions of player 1 and 2 are a and b, respectively.
– p0 ∈ ∆(K) is the initial probability of the state.
– Qa ∈R
|K|×|K| denotes the transition matrix if player 1 plays a∈ A. Qa(k,k
′) is the
conditional probability that the next state is k′ given the current action is a and
the current state is k.
An N-stage asymmetric information stochastic game with a single controller is
played as follows. At the beginning of stage t = 1, . . . ,N, the state kt is chosen by
nature according to the initial probability p0 if this is the first stage, or the transition
law Qat−1(kt−1, :) otherwise. The current state kt is only observed by player 1, and
hence player 1 is called the informed player while player 2 is called the uninformed
player. Both players choose their actions at and bt simultaneously, which are observ-
able by both players. The resulting one stage payoff of player 1, i.e. the one stage cost
of player 2, isMkt (at ,bt). We assume both players have perfect recall.
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At the beginning of stage t, the available state history and action history of players
1 and 2 are indicated by St = {k1, . . . ,kt}, It = {a1, . . . ,at−1} and Jt = {b1, . . . ,bt−1},
respectively. Player 1’s behavior strategy is an element σ = (σt)
N
t=1, where for each t,
σt : K
t×At−1×Bt−1 → ∆(A). Player 2’s behavior strategy is an element τ = (τt )
N
t=1,
where for each t, τt : A
t−1×Bt−1 → ∆(B). Denote by ΣN and TN the set of N-stage
strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively.
Every quadruple (p0,σ ,τ,Q) induces a probability Pp0,σ ,τ,Q over the set of plays
(K×A×B)N. We denote by Ep0,σ ,τ,Q the corresponding expectation operator. The
total payoff of the N-stage asymmetric information stochastic game is defined as
γN(p0,σ ,τ) = Ep0,σ ,τ,Q
(
N
∑
t=1
Mkt (at ,bt)
)
(1)
The N-stage asymmetric information stochastic game ΓN(p0) is defined as the zero-
sum game with strategy spaces ΣN and TN , and payoff function γN(p0,σ ,τ).
In this game, player 1 wants to maximize the total payoff, while player 2 wants to
minimize it. Therefore, player 1 has a security level vN(p0), which is also called the
maxmin value of the game and defined as
vN(p0) = max
σ∈ΣN
min
τ∈TN
γN(p0,σ ,τ).
A strategy σ∗ that guarantees player 1’s security level, i.e. minτ∈T γN(p0,σ
∗,τ) =
vN(p0), is called a security strategy of player 1. Player 2 also has a security level
v¯n(p0) which is defined as
v¯N(p0) = min
τ∈TN
max
σ∈ΣN
γN(p0,σ ,τ).
Player 2’s security level is also called the minmax value of the game, and a strat-
egy τ∗ ∈ T that guarantees the security level of player 2 is a security strategy of
player 2. Since this is a finite game (finite horizon, action sets, and state set) and be-
havior strategies are considered, its maxmin value and minmax value match [18]. In
this case, we say the game has a value vN(p0) = vN(p0) = v¯N(p0), and the security
strategy pair (σ∗,τ∗) is the saddle point of the game.
3 Security strategies of the informed player
The security strategies of the informed players in asymmetric information stochastic
games have been thoroughly studied in previous work [7, 13, 15]. For completeness
of this paper, we will review the related results in this section. Interested readers can
find proofs in the corresponding references.
3.1 History based security strategy and its LP formulation
Renault showed that the informed player’s security strategy only depends on the cur-
rent state and its own action history [13]. We state this property in the following
lemma.
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Proposition 1 (Proposition 5.1 in [13]) Consider an N-stage asymmetric informa-
tion stochastic game ΓN(p0). The informed player has a security strategy that, at
every stage t, only depends on the current state kt , and on the actions history It of the
informed player.
Based on this property, by mathematical induction, [7] presented an LP whose
size is only linear with respect to the size of the uninformed player’s action set. Propo-
sition 1 indicates that there is no loss of generality in only considering the informed
player’s behavior strategies that depend on kt and It only. Therefore, for the rest of
this paper, we only consider informed player’s behavior strategy σt as a function from
K×At−1 to ∆(A).
Before presenting the simplified LP, we first define a matrix variable ZIt ∈R
|A|×|K|
and a scalar variable ℓIt ∈ R. Let Z = (ZIt )It∈At−1,t=1,...,N and ℓ = (ℓIt )It∈At−1,t=1,...,N .
Denote the sets of all possible values that Z and ℓ can take by Z and L. The history
based security strategy of the informed player can be computed according to the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Theorem III.3 in [7]) Consider an N-stage asymmetric information
stochastic game ΓN(p0) with the initial probability p0. The game value vN(p0) of
ΓN(p0) satisfies
vN(p0) = max
Z∈Z ,ℓ∈L
N
∑
t=1
∑
It∈At−1
ℓIt (2)
s.t. ∑
k∈K
MTk ZIt (:,k)≥ ℓIt1, ∀It ∈ A
t−1,∀t = 1, . . . ,N (3)
1TZIt (:,k) = ZIt−1(a, :)Qa(:,k), ∀It = (It−1,a) ∈ A
t−1,∀k ∈ K, (4)
∀t = 2, . . . ,N (5)
1TZI1 (:,k) = p0(k), ∀k ∈ K (6)
ZIt (:,k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,∀It ∈ A
t−1,∀t = 1, . . . ,N (7)
Moreover, a security strategy σ∗t (k, It) of the informed player at stage t is
σ∗t (k, It) =
{
Z∗It
(:,k)
1TZ∗It
(:,k)
, if Z∗It (:,k) 6= 0;
0, othewise
(8)
where Z∗ is the optimal solution of the LP formulation (2-7).
3.2 Belief based security strategy and its LP based algorithm
The memory required to record the history based security strategy increases exponen-
tially with N in game ΓN(p0). Therefore, a sufficient statistics based security strategy
is of interest, especially when N is large. When studying the game value of a finite
stage game, Renault showed that at stage t, the sufficient statistics of the informed
player is the stage index and the conditional probability pt of the current state given
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the action history of the informed player. The conditional probability pt is also called
the belief state which is updated as follows.
pt+1 = φ
T (pt ,Xt ,a)Q
a, (9)
where φ : K×∆(A)K×A→ ∆(K) is a vector valued function whose kth element is
φk(pt ,Xt ,a) =
pt(k)Xt(a,k)
x¯(pt ,xt ,a)
,∀k ∈ K (10)
Xt(:,k) = σt(k, It), and x¯(pt ,Xt ,a) = ∑k∈K pt(k)Xt(a,k) is the probability that player
1 plays a at stage t.
Based on the belief state pt , a recursive formula to compute the game value
vN(p0) was provided in [13], and the sufficient statistics of the informed player was
also given at the same time.
Theorem 2 (Proposition 5.1 and Remark 5.2 in [13]) Consider an n stage asym-
metric information stochastic gameΓn(p). Its game value vn(p) satisfies the following
recursive formula.
vn(p) (11)
= max
X∈∆ (A)|K|
min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
(
∑
k∈K
p(k)XT (:,k)Mk yˆ+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(p,x,a)vn−1(φ
T (p,X ,a)Qa)
)
(12)
= min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
max
X∈∆ (A)|K|
(
∑
k∈K
p(k)XT (:,k)Mk yˆ+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(p,x,a)vn−1(φ
T (p,X ,a)Qa)
)
(13)
Moreover, the informed player has a security strategy at stage t that only depends on
stage t and belief state pt .
Based on this theorem, one can derive an algorithm to compute the belief based
security strategy of the informed player as follows.
Algorithm 3.
1. Initialization
(a) Read payoff matrices M, transition matrices Q, time horizon N and initial
probability p0.
(b) Set t = 1 and pt = p0. Read kt .
2. Solve LP (2-7) by replacing N and p0 by N+ 1− t and pt . A security strategy at
t is σ∗1 (kt , I1) computed according to (8).
3. Draw an action at according to the security strategy σ
∗
1 (kt , I1).
4. Update pt+1 according to (9).
5. Update t = t+ 1, read kt .
6. If t ≤ N, go to step 2). Otherwise, end.
Compared with history based security strategy, the belief based security strategy
only needs to record stage t and belief state pt whose size is fixed and much smaller
than It which is recorded in history based security strategy, especially when the time
horizon N is large. The belief based security strategy also provides us a research
direction in dealing with infinite horizon asymmetric information stochastic games,
which was studied in [8] for the discounted case.
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4 Security strategies of the uninformed player
While the security strategies of informed players in asymmetric information stochas-
tic games were well studied in the previous work, only a few papers studied the
security strategies of uninformed players [3,14]. Both references studied the security
strategies of the uninformed player using the dual games of the corresponding game
model. We follow a similar path in this section, noting that our game model is more
general than that considered in [3], and incomparable with that of [14].
4.1 Regret based security strategies and Jt independent security strategies
Let us first introduce the dual game of the asymmetric information stochastic game
ΓN(p). A dual asymmetric information stochastic game is specified by a six-tuple
(K,A,B,M,Q,α), where K,A,B,M,Q are defined in the same way as in the primal
game ΓN(p), and α ∈ R
|K| is the initial vector payoff of player 1. The dual game is
played exactly in the same way as the primal game except that at the first stage, player
1, instead of Nature, chooses the state. Let p ∈ ∆(K) be player 1’s mixed strategy to
choose the initial state. The total payoff in the dual game is
gN(α,σ ,τ) = Ep,σ ,τ,Q
(
α(k1)+
N
∑
t=1
Mkt (at ,bt)
)
. (14)
TheN-stage dual asymmetric information stochastic gameGN(α) is defined as a two-
player zero-sum game with strategy spaces ∆(K)×ΣN and TN , and payoff function
gN(p,σ ,τ).
The dual game GN(α) is still a finite game. Since behavior strategies are con-
sidered, the dual game has a value, i.e. wN(α) = maxσ∈ΣN minτ∈TN gN(α,σ ,τ) =
minτ∈TN maxσ∈ΣN gN(α,σ ,τ). Before studying the relation between the game values
of the primal game and the dual game, we introduce the initial regret of the primal
game Γn(p) as follows. Denote the informed player strategy from stage 2 to N as
σ2:N ∈ Σ2:N , where Σ2:N is the set of all possible values that σ2:N can take. Let τ
∗
be the uninformed player’s security strategy in primal game Γn(p). The initial regret
αˆ0 ∈R
|K| of a primal game Γn(p) is defined as
αˆ0(k) =− max
σ1(k, /0)∈∆ (A)
σ2:N∈Σ2:N
E(σ1(k, /0),σ2:N),τ∗,Q(
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at ,bt)|k1 = k). (15)
The kth element of the initial regret is the difference between 0, the total payoff
realized at the beginning of stage 1, and the security level that the uninformed player’s
security strategy can guarantee if the game state is k. Later, we will see that if we use
the initial regret of primal game Γn(p) as the initial vector payoff in the dual game,
the security strategy of the uninformed player in the dual game is also the security
strategy of the uninformed player in the primal game.Moreover, the game value vn(p)
of the primal game equals to the game value wn(αˆ0) minus p
T αˆ0. In this way, we can
evaluate the game value of the primal game from the game value of the dual game.
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Now, let us introduce the relations between the game values of the primal game and
the dual game.
Theorem 4 Consider an n-stage asymmetric information stochastic game Γn(p) and
its dual game Gn(α). Let vn(p) and wn(α) be the game values of Γn(p) and Gn(α).
We have
vn(p) = min
α∈R|K|
{wn(α)− p
Tα}, (16)
wn(α) = max
p∈∆ (K)
{vn(p)+ p
Tα}. (17)
Moreover, the initial regret αˆ0 of the primal game Γn(p) is an optimal solution to the
minimum problem (16).
Proof. First, we will show that
vn(p)≤ wn(α)− p
Tα,∀p ∈ ∆(K),α ∈ R|K|. (18)
Let τ+ be player 2’s security strategy in the dual gameGn(α). We then have wn(α) =
maxp∈∆ (K)maxσ∈Σn p
Tα + γn(p,σ ,τ
+), which implies that for any p and α ,
max
σ∈Σn
pTα + γn(p,σ ,τ
+)
=pTα +max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ
+)
≤wn(α)
Hence, for any p ∈ ∆(K) and α ∈ R|K|
max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ
+)≤ wn(α)− p
Tα. (19)
Since for any p ∈ ∆(K), vn(p)≤maxσ∈Σn γn(p,σ ,τ
+), equation (18) is proven.
Second, we show that for any p ∈ ∆(K), there exists an α ∈ R|K| such that
vn(p)≥ wn(α)− p
Tα. (20)
Let τ∗ be player 2’s security strategy in the primal game Γn(p). From the definition of
the initial regret αˆ0 of the primal gameΓn(p), we see that vn(p) =−p
T αˆ0. Notice that
τ∗ may not be player 2’s security strategy any more if the initial probability changes.
Therefore, we have for any p′ ∈ ∆(K), vn(p
′)≤maxσ∈Σn γn(p
′,σ ,τ∗) =−p′T αˆ0.
wn(αˆ0) = max
p′∈∆ (K)
max
σ∈Σn
min
τ∈Tn
p′T αˆ0+ γn(p
′,σ ,τ∗)
= max
p′∈∆ (K)
p′T αˆ0+max
σ∈Σn
min
τ∈Tn
γn(p
′,σ ,τ)
= max
p′∈∆ (K)
p′T αˆ0+ vn(p
′).
Since vn(p
′) ≤ −p′T αˆ0 for any p
′ ∈ ∆(K), it can be derived that wn(αˆ0) ≤ 0 =
vn(p) + p
T αˆ0, which proves that there exists an α ∈ R
|K| such that equation (20)
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
holds. Equation (18) and equation (20) imply equation (16), and αˆ0 is an optimal
solution to the minimum problem in (16).
Finally, we prove equation (17).
wn(α) =min
τ∈Tn
max
p∈∆ (K)
max
σ∈Σn
pTα + γn(p,σ ,τ)
=min
τ∈Tn
max
p∈∆ (K)
pTα +max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ).
Function γn(p,σ ,τ) is linear in τ , and we have for any ε ∈ (0,1),
max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,ετ +(1− ε)τ
′)
=max
σ∈Σn
εγn(p,σ ,τ)+ (1− ε)γn(p,σ ,τ
′)
≤ε max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ)+ (1− ε)max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ
′),
which shows that maxσ∈Σn γn(p,σ ,τ) is convex in τ . Together with the fact that
pTα +maxσ∈Σn γn(p,σ ,τ) is linear in p, according to the Sion’s minimax theo-
rem [17], we have
wn(α) = max
p∈∆ (K)
min
τ∈Tn
pTα +max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ)
= max
p∈∆ (K)
pTα + vn(p),
which completes the proof.
While Theorem 4 provides the relations between the game values of the primal
game and the dual game, the next theorem states that the in some special case, the se-
curity strategy of the uninformed player in the dual game is also the security strategy
of the uninformed player in the primal game.
Theorem 5 Given an optimal solution α∗ to the minimum problem (16), any security
strategy of the uninformed player in the dual game Gn(α
∗) is a security strategy of
the uninformed player in the primal game Γn(p).
Proof. Let τ+ be a security strategy in the dual game Gn(α
∗). Equation (19) implies
that maxσ∈Σn γn(p,σ ,τ
+) ≤ wn(α
∗)− pTα∗ = vn(p). The last equality is derived
from the fact that α∗ is the optimal solution to the minimum problem (16). Mean-
while, vn(p) ≤ max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ
+). Therefore, we have vn(p) = max
σ∈Σn
γn(p,σ ,τ
+), and
τ+ is a security strategy of the uninformed player in the primal game Γn(p).
Equation (16) provides us a way to evaluate the game value of the primal game
Γn(p) from the game value of the dual game Gn(α). Generally speaking, for any
initial vector payoff α , wn(α)− p
Tα is an upper bound on vn(p), and if we play
the uninformed player’s security strategy of the dual game in the primal game, the
security level is no less than vn(p). However, if the initial vector payoff of the dual
game is the initial regret in the primal game, we will have vn(p) = wn(αˆ0)− p
T αˆ0,
and the security strategy of the uninformed player’s in the dual game can guarantee
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an expected total payoff of vn(p) in the primal game. Therefore, when playing the
primal game Γn(p), we can see the game as a dual game Gn(αˆ0) and play the dual
game instead.
A security strategy of the uninformed player in the dual game has some nice
properties. According to Theorem 5, these properties also apply to security strate-
gies of the uninformed player in the primal game. To explore the properties of un-
informed player’s security strategy, we first present a recursive formula of the game
value wn(α) in dual game Gn(α).
Proposition 2 Consider a dual asymmetric information stochastic game Gn+1(α).
Its game value wn+1(α) satisfies
wn+1(α) (21)
= min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
max
Π∈∆ (K×A)
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ)+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(Π ,a)vn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa),
where vn(p) is the game value of primal game Γn(p).
Proof. According to equation (17) and (12), we have
wn+1(α)
= max
p∈∆ (K)
max
X∈∆ (A)|K|
min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
pTα + ∑
k∈K
p(k)XT (:,k)Mk yˆ+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(p,X ,a)vn(φ
T (p,s,a)Qa)
= max
p∈∆ (K)
max
X∈∆ (A)|K|
min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
{
∑
k∈K,a∈A
p(k)X(a,k)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ)
+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(p,X ,a)vn(φ
T (p,s,a)Qa)
}
= max
Π∈∆ (K×A)
min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ)+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(Π ,a)vn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa)
where the last equality is derived by letting Π(k,a) = p(k)X(a,k).
Next, we need to change the order of the maximum function and the minimum
function. To this end, we will show that function
f (Π , yˆ) = ∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ)++ ∑
a∈A
x¯(Π ,a)vn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa)
is concave inΠ and linear in yˆ. According to Lemma III.1 in [7], x¯(Π ,a)vn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa)=
vn(Π
T (:,a)Qa). Since vn(p) is concave in p [19], it is concave in Π , and f (Π , yˆ) is
also concave in Π . Together with the fact that f (Π , yˆ) is linear in yˆ, according to
Sion’s minimax theorem [17], we have equation (21).
The idea behind equation (21) is similar to the idea of dynamic programming.The
first term of (21) is the expected current payoff, and the second term is the expected
future payoff. In that expression, the uninformed player controls y, its strategy at stage
1, and aims to minimize the total expected payoff. The informed player controls p,
the probability to choose the initial game state, and X , its strategy at stage 1, which
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means that it controls the joint probability Π of the state and its action at stage 1, and
the informed player’s objective is to maximize the total expected payoff.
From stage 2 on, however, the game’s state is not freely chosen by the informed
player but distributed according to φT (Π ,a)Qa. In turn, the future payoff can be
seen as the value of primal game Γn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa). Using Theorem 4, we can further
evaluate this value by, again, looking at the corresponding dual game. This, together
with Proposition 2, allows us to derive a recursive formula for the value of a dual
game as follows.
Proposition 3 Consider a dual asymmetric information stochastic game Gn+1(α).
Its game value wn+1(α) satisfies
wn+1(α) (22)
= min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
min
(βa∈R|K|)a∈A
max
pi∈∆ (K×A)
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ+α(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)),
where w1(α) =minyˆ∈∆ (B)maxΠ∈∆ (K×A) ∑k∈K,a∈A Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ+α(k)).
Proof. From equation (21) and (16), we have
wn+1(α)
= min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
max
Π∈∆ (K×A)
{
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ)
+ ∑
a∈A
x¯(Π ,a) min
βa∈R|K|
{wn(βa)−φ
T (Π ,a)Qaβa}
}
= min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
max
Π∈∆ (K×A)
min
(βa∈R|K|)a∈A
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(α(k)+Mk(a, :)yˆ−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)) .
Now, we need to change the order of maxpi∈∆ (K×A)minβa∈R|K|,∀a∈A. For this pur-
pose, we need to show that wn(·) is convex. Let β1,β2 be any |K| dimensional real
vectors. For any ε ∈ (0,1),
wn(εβ1+(1− ε)β2) = max
p∈∆ (K)
{vn(p)+ p
T (εβ1+(1− ε)β2)}
= max
p∈∆ (K)
{ε(vn(p)+ p
Tβ1)+ (1− ε)(vn(p)+ p
Tβ2)}
≤ε max
p∈∆ (K)
{vn(p)+ p
Tβ1}+(1− ε) max
p∈∆ (K)
{vn(p)+ p
Tβ2}
=εwn(β1)+ (1− ε)wn(β2).
Therefore,wn(·) is convex. Together with the fact that∑k∈K,a∈A Π(k,a)(α(k) +Mk(a, :
)yˆ−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)) is linear in Π , according to Sion’s minimax theorem [17],
equation (22) is shown.
The variable βa is introduced when we replace vn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa) with
min
βa∈R|K|
{wn(βa)−φ
T (Π ,a)Qaβa}
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, and can be seen as the uninformed player’s guess about the initial regret, i.e. future
cost compared to zero, of the future primal game Γn(φ
T (Π ,a)Qa). On one hand, the
uninformed player controls its strategy y. On the other hand, it takes a guess about the
initial regret βa of the future primal game given the informed player’s current action
a. Given y and βa, the expected total payoff is ∑k∈K,a∈A Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ+α(k)−
Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)). Since the informed player aims to maximize the expected total
payoff, the uninformed player will choose y and βa such that the maximum expected
total payoff is minimized. The optimal solution (β ∗a )a∈A to the minmax problem (22)
is called the regret at stage 2 in a dual game Gn+1(α). The regret at stage t in a dual
game is formally defined as below.
Definition 1 Consider a dual gameGN(α). We call α the regret at stage 1, and denote
it as α1.
Given regret αt and informed player’s action a at stage t, let yˆ
∗ and (β ∗a )a∈A be
the optimal solution to the following problem.
min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
min
(βa∈R|K|)a∈A
max
pi∈∆ (K×A)
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ+αt(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+wN−t(βa)),
(23)
We call β ∗a the regret at stage t+ 1, and denote it as αt+1.
Now, we are ready to present a regret based strategy for the uninformed player in
a dual game. Let yˆ∗ and β ∗ be the optimal solution to the minmax problem (22). At
every stage t with vector payoff αt , we can use the optimal solution yˆ
∗ as the current
strategy of the uninformed player, and update the vector payoff αt+1 at the next stage
to β ∗at . The detailed algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 6.
1. Initialization
– Read payoff matrices M, transition matrices Q, and initial vector payoff α .
– Set stage t = 1, and αt = α .
2. Find out the optimal solution yˆ∗ and (β ∗a )a∈A to the minmax problem (23).
3. Draw an action according to yˆ∗ and read the action at of the informed player.
4. Set t = t+ 1, and update αt = β
∗
at
.
5. If t ≤ N, go to step 2). Otherwise, end.
We shall notice that the strategy derived in this algorithm is independent of σ , the
strategy of the informed player.
The next question is whether the strategy constructed in Algorithm 6 is a security
strategy of the uninformed player in dual game GN(α), and the answer is yes. We
provide the detail in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 In the dual asymmetric information game GN(α), the uninformed player
has a security strategy at stage t that only depends on regret αt and the stage t.
Moreover, such a security strategy can be constructed using Algorithm 6.
Proof. We will construct a strategy of the uninformed player as in Algorithm 6.
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Mathematical induction is used to prove the theorem. First, we see that in dual
game G1(α), it is easy to check that yˆ
∗ is a security strategy of player 2.
Assume that τ∗(α) is a security strategy of player 2 in dual game Gn(α) con-
structed as in Algorithm 6. Let yˆ∗ and β ∗ be the optimal solution to the minmax
problem (22). We will show that in dual game Gn+1(α), if player 2 plays yˆ
∗ at stage
1, and τ∗(β ∗a1) afterwards, then player 2 can guarantee the game value wn+1(α).
For any a∈A, since τ∗(β ∗a ) is a security strategy of player 2 in dual gameGn(β
∗
a ),
we have
γn(p,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a ))+ p
Tβ ∗a ≤ wn(β
∗
a ),∀p ∈ ∆(K),∀σ ∈ Σn.
Let pΠ (k
′) = ∑k∈K,a∈A Π(k,a)Qa(k,k
′), where Π ∈ ∆(K×A). We have
γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a ))≤ ∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(wn(β
∗
a )− ∑
k′∈K
Qak,k′β
∗
a (k
′)),
for all Π ∈ ∆(K×A),a ∈ A,σ ∈ Σn. Hence,
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a ))≤ ∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(wn(β
∗
a )−Qa(k, :)β
∗
a ),
for all Π ∈ ∆(K×A),σ ∈ Σn. Hence,
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)+ γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a )))
≤ ∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(wn(β
∗
a )−Qa(k, :)β
∗
a +Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)),
for all Π ∈ ∆(K×A),a∈ A,σ ∈ Σn. Therefore, we have for all pi ∈∆(K×A),σ ∈Σn,
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)+ γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a )))
≤ max
pi∈∆ (K×A)
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(wn(β
∗
a )−Qa(k, :)β
∗
a +Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)).
Since yˆ∗ and β ∗ is the optimal solution to the minmax problem (22), we have for all
Π ∈ ∆(K×A),σ ∈ Σn,
∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)+ γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a )))≤ wn+1(α).
Let Π(k,a) = p1(k)X(a,k), where p1 is player 1’s strategy to choose a state, and
X(:,k) = σ1(k, /0) is player 1’s strategy to choose an action at stage 1 given state k. It
is straight forward to show that
gn+1(α,(X ,σ),(yˆ
∗,τ∗(β ∗a ))= ∑
k∈K,a∈A
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ
∗+α(k)+γn(pΠ ,σ ,τ
∗(β ∗a ))).
Therefore, we have for any p1 ∈ ∆(K) and (x,σ) ∈ Σn+1,
gn+1(α,(X ,σ),(yˆ
∗,τ∗(β ∗a ))) ≤ wn+1(α),
which completes the proof.
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Regret αt and stage t form a sufficient statistics for the uninformed player to
make decisions. The reason why αt plays such a role (similar as that of pt for the in-
formed player in the primal game) for the uninformed player in the dual game can be
explained intuitively as follows. In a primal game, to decide the current strategy, the
informed player needs to estimate the current payoff and the future payoff vn−1(pt+1)
(equation (12)). The belief pt+1 at the next stage decides the future payoff. Similarly,
in a dual game, to decide the current strategy, the uninformed player also needs to
estimate the current payoff and the future payoff vn(pt+1) (equation (21)). While the
uninformed player cannot compute pt+1 without the informed player’s strategy, it can
consider the worst case scenario, and compute the worst case vector security level of
the uninformed player, and hence the regret for the future game at the next stage. The
regret at the next stage characterizes the worst case future payoff, and hence plays an
important role for the uninformed player in making decisions.
Noticing that regret αt+1 at stage t+ 1 derived in Algorithm 6 only depends on
regret αt at stage t and the player 1’s action at , we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In a dual game GN(α), the uninformed player has a security strategy
that, at stage t, only depends on stage t and the action history It of the informed
player.
Now, let us get back to the primal game ΓN(p). Since for any p ∈ ∆(K), there
always exists an α such that any security strategy of the uninformed player in dual
game GN(α) is a security strategy of the uninformed player in primal game ΓN(p)
(Theorem 4), the properties described in Theorem 7 and Corollary 1 are also true for
security strategies of the uninformed player in the primal game. Let us first define
regrets in a primal game.
Definition 2 In a primal game ΓN(p), αˆ1 ∈R
|K| is called the regret at stage 1 if αˆ1 is
an optimal solution to the minimum problem in equation (16).
Given the regret αˆt and the informed player’s action at at stage t, let yˆ
∗ and β ∗
be an optimal solution of the minmax problem in (23). We call β ∗at the regret at stage
t+ 1, and denote it as αˆt+1.
According to Definition 2, the initial regret αˆ0 defined in (15) is also the regret at
stage 1 in primal game ΓN(p).
Theorem 4 says that any security strategy of the uninformed player in the corre-
sponding dual game with initial vector payoff αˆ1, the regret at stage 1 in the primal
game, is a security strategy of the uninformed player in the primal game. Theorem 7
states that if we update the regret in dual game as in Algorithm 6, then the security
strategy of the uninformed player depends only on the regret and the current stage.
The regret defined in Definition 2 in primal game is updated exactly the same as in
Definition 1. Therefore, we can compute uninformed player’s security strategy and
update the regret using the following algorithm.
Algorithm 8.
– Initialization
– Read payoff matrices M, transition matrices Q, time horizon N, and initial
probability p0.
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– Set t = 1, and pt = p0.
– Compute the optimal solution α∗ to the minimum problem in (16) with n=N and
p= p0. Set αˆ1 = α
∗.
– Compute the optimal solution yˆ∗ and (β ∗a )a∈A to the minmax problem (23) with
αt = αˆt .
– Draw an action b ∈ B according to yˆ∗ and read the action a of the informed
player.
– Set t = t+ 1, and update αˆt = β
∗
a .
– If t ≤ N, go to step 3. Otherwise, end.
Corollary 2 Consider a primal game ΓN(p). The uninformed player has a security
strategy at stage t, that only depends on the regret αˆt and the stage t, and such a
security strategy can be constructed by Algorithm 8. Moreover, this security strategy
only depends on stage t and the history action It of the informed player.
Now that the basic steps to find out a security strategy of the uninformed player
in a primal game are clear, we further provide LP formulations to compute the regret
at stage 1, a security strategy in the corresponding dual game, and the regret at every
stage.
4.2 LP formulation of history based security strategies
As mentioned in Section 3.1, a security strategy of the uninformed player can also be
computed by solving an LP based on a sequence form [4] whose size is linear with
respect to the size of the game tree (|K|N×|A|N×|B|N). Based on the fact that player
2 has a security strategy that is independent of its own history action, we can reduce
the size of the LP to be linear with respect to |B|. This simplified LP formulation is
introduced in this subsection.
Consider an asymmetric information stochastic game ΓN(p0). We define a real-
ization plan rt(St , It+1) given state history St and player 1’s action history as It+1
as rt(St , It+1) = p0(k1)∏
t
s=1 σ
as
s (ks, Is), where σ
as
s (ks, Is) denotes the asth element of
σs(ks, Is) . Let r = (rt)
N
t=1, and R be the set of all possible values that the realization
plan can take. The realization plan satisfies
∑
at
rt(St , It+1) = rt−1(st−1, It),∀St ∈ K
t , It ∈ A
t−1,∀t = 1, . . . ,N, (24)
rt (St , It+1)≥ 0,∀t = 1, . . . ,N. (25)
It is straight forward to show that p(SN , IN+1) = rN(SN , IN+1)∏
N−1
t=1 Qat (kt ,kt+1).
Before presenting the simplified LP formulation for uninformedplayers, we would
like to introduce some variables used in the LP formulation. Based on Corollary 2,
we only consider player 2’s strategies that depend on the informed player’s history
action only. Let Ft = (St , It) ∈ K
t ×At−1 be the full information the informed player
has at the beginning of stage t. Let yIt = τt(It) ∈ ∆(B), y = (yIt )It∈At−1,t=1,...,N , and
Y be the set of all possible values that y can take. Let ℓFt ∈ R be a real variable. We
use ℓ = (ℓFt )Ft∈Kt×At−1,t=1,...,N to denote the collection of the ℓ variable, and use L to
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denote the set of all possible values that l can take. The simplified LP formulation is
given below.
Theorem 9 Consider a primal asymmetric information stochastic game Γn(p). Its
game value vn(p) satisfies
vn(p) =min
y∈Y
min
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
pkℓF1 , where F1 = ((k, /0)), (26)
s.t. ∑
kt∈K
ℓFt ≤ ℓFt−1, ∀Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1,∀t = 2, . . . ,n,
where Ft = (Ft−1,(kt ,at−1)) (27)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)yIt ≤ ℓFn , ∀Fn ∈ K
n×An−1,∀an ∈ A.
where Fn = ((k1, /0), . . . ,(kn,an−1))
(28)
A security strategy τ∗t (It) of player 2 at stage t given the action history It of player 1
is τ∗t (It) = y
∗
It
, where y∗ is the optimal solution of LP (26-28).
Proof.
vn(p) = min
τ∈Tn
max
σ∈Σn
∑
Sn∈Kn,In+1∈An
p(Sn, In+1)E(
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at ,bt)|Sn, In+1)
=min
y∈Y
max
σ∈Σn
∑
Sn∈Kn,In+1∈An
p(k1)
n
∏
t=1
σatt (kt , It)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)yIt
=min
y∈Y
max
r∈R
∑
Sn∈Kn,In+1∈An
r(Sn, In+1)
(
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)yIt
)
,
s.t.equation(24− 25).
According to the strong duality theorem, equation (26-28) is shown.
The size of the LP problem in (26-28) is O(|K|n|A|n|B|). Let us first look at the
variable size. Variable y has a size of (1+ |A|+ . . .+ |A|n−1)|B| which is of or-
der |A|n|B|. Variable ℓ is of size |K|(1+ |A||K|+ . . .+(|A||K|)n−1) which is of or-
der |A|n|K|n. Next, we will analyze the constraint size. Constraint 27 has a size of
(|A||K|+(|A||K|)2 + . . .+(|A||K|)n−1 which is of order |A|n|K|n. The size of con-
straint 28 is also of order |A|n|K|n. Therefore, in all, we see that the size of the LP
problem (26-28) is O(|K|n|A|n|B|).
The LP formulation provides us not only with a history based security strategy
for player 2, but also the regret αˆ1 at stage 1 in the primal game.
Proposition 4 Let y∗, ℓ∗ be the optimal solution of LP problem (26-28). The initial
regret of the primal game Γn(p) is−ℓ
∗
1, where ℓ
∗
1 = (ℓ
∗
F1
)F1∈K× /0, i.e.−ℓ
∗
1 is an optimal
solution to the minimum problem in equation (16).
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Proof. First, we show that wn(−ℓ
∗
1) ≥ 0. Equation (17) indicates that wn(−ℓ
∗
1) ≥
vn(p)− p
Tℓ∗1 = 0.
Second, we show that wn(−ℓ
∗
1) ≤ 0. To this end, we first show that α¯y∗(k) =
E(∑nt=1Mkt (at ,bt)|k1 = k)≤ ℓ
∗
1(k), for all k ∈ K.
α¯y∗(k) = ∑
k2:n∈Kn−1
∑
a1:n∈An
P(k2, . . . ,kn,a1, . . . ,an|k1 = k)
E
(
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at ,bt))|k1 = k,k2, . . . ,kn,a1, . . . ,an)
)
= ∑
k2:n∈Kn−1
∑
a1:n∈An
n
∏
t=1
σatt (kt , It)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt−1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)y
∗
It
.
Equation (28) implies that
α¯y∗(k)≤ ∑
k2:n∈Kn−1
∑
a1:n∈An
n
∏
t=1
σatt (kt , It)ℓFn
where Fn = ((k, /0),(k2,a1), . . . ,(kn,an−1))
= ∑
k2:n∈Kn−1
∑
a1:n−1∈An−1
n−1
∏
t=1
σatt (kt , It)ℓFn
≤ ∑
k2:n−1∈Kn−2
∑
a1:n−1∈An−1
n−1
∏
t=1
σatt (kt , It)lFn−1
where the last inequality is derived from equation (27). Following the same steps, we
can show that α¯y∗(k)≤ ℓ
∗
1(k). For any p
′ ∈∆(K), we have vn(p
′)≤max
σ∈Σn
γn(p
′,σ ,y∗)=
p′T α¯y∗ ≤ p
′T ℓ∗1. Therefore, wn(−ℓ
∗
1) =maxp′∈∆ (K) vn(p
′)− p′T ℓ∗1 ≤ 0.
Therefore,we havewn(−ℓ
∗
1)= 0. From equation (26), we havewn(−ℓ
∗
1)− p
T (−ℓ∗1)=
vn(p). This completes the proof.
4.3 LP formulation of regret based security strategy
As discussed in Section 4.1, the uninformed player can construct a regret based se-
curity strategy following Algorithm 11. Proposition 4 provides an LP formulation to
compute the regret at stage 1. In this section, we further study this LP formulation and
show how the regret vector can be efficiently updated. To this end, we first introduce
the LP formulation to compute the game value of a dual game Gn(α).
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Proposition 5 The game value wn(α) of a dual game Gn(α) satisfies
wn(α) =min
y∈Y
min
ℓ∈L
min
ℓˆ∈R
ℓˆ (29)
s.t.α(k)+ ℓF1 ≤ ℓˆ, ∀k ∈ K,where F1 = ((k, /0)), (30)
∑
kt∈K
ℓFt ≤ lFt−1 , ∀Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1,∀t = 2, . . . ,n,
whereFt = (Ft−1,(kt ,at−1)) (31)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)yIt ≤ ℓFn , ∀Fn ∈ K
n×An−1,∀an ∈ A. (32)
Proof.
wn(α) =min
y∈Y
max
p∈∆ (K)
max
σ∈Σn
pTα +E(γn(p,σ ,τ))
=min
y∈Y
max
p∈∆ (K)
pTα +max
σ∈Σn
E(γn(p,σ ,τ))
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 9, we have
wn(α) =min
y∈Y
max
p∈∆ (K)
pTα +min
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
pkℓF1 ,where F1 = ((k, /0))
s.t.equation(27− 28).
Since pTα +∑k∈K p
kℓF1 is linear in both p and l, according to Sion’s minimax theo-
rem [17], we have
wn(α) =min
y∈Y
min
ℓ∈L
max
p∈∆ (K)
pTα + ∑
k∈K
pkℓF1
s.t.equation(27− 28).
According to the strong duality theorem, equation (29-32) is shown.
Now, we are ready to present the LP formulation to compute the regret based
security strategy of player 2 and to update the regret in a primal game. With a little
abuse of notation y and ℓ, we use ya,It ∈∆(B) to indicate a |B| dimensional probability
variable given a∈A and It ∈A
t−1, and ℓa,Ft ∈R to denote a scalar variable given a∈A
and Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1. The collection of (ya,It ))It ∈ A
t−1, t = 1, . . . ,n is denoted as ya,
and the collections of (ℓa,Ft )Ft∈Kt×At−1,t=1,...,n is denoted by ℓa.
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Theorem 10 Consider a primal game Γn+1(p). Let αˆ1 be the regret at stage 1 in the
primal game. The game value wn+1(αˆ1) of the dual game Gn+1(αˆ1) satisfies
wn+1(αˆ1) = min
yˆ∈∆ (B)
min
(βa∈R|K|)a∈A
min
ℓ˜∈R
min
(ℓˆa∈R)a∈A
min
(ya∈Y,ℓa∈L)a∈A
ℓ˜ (33)
s.t.Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+ ℓˆa ≤ ℓ˜,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K, (34)
βa(k)+ ℓa,F1 ≤ ℓˆa,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K,where F1 = ((k, /0)) (35)
∑
kt∈K
ℓa,Ft ≤ ℓa,Ft−1,∀a ∈ A,∀Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1,∀t = 2, . . . ,n,
where Ft = (Ft−1,(kt ,at−1)) (36)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)ya,It ≤ ℓa,Fn ,∀a ∈ A,Fn ∈ K
n×An−1,∀an ∈ A.
(37)
Moreover, player 2’s security strategy at the current step is yˆ∗ and the regret at the
next step is β ∗a if the current action of player 1 is a.
Proof. Theorem4 indicates that any security strategy of player 2 in dual gameGn+1(αˆ1)
is a security strategy of player 2 in the primal game Γn+1(p).
Let yˆ∗ and β ∗ be the optimal solution to the minmax problem (22). According
to Theorem 7 and Definition 2, the current security strategy of player 2 in dual game
Gn+1(αˆ1) is the optimal solution yˆ
∗, and the regret at the next stage is β ∗a if the current
action of player 1 is a. Now we need to build an LP to solve the minmax problem
(22).
According to the strong duality theorem, we have
max
pi∈∆ (K×A)
Π(k,a)(Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)) (38)
=min
ℓ˜∈R
ℓ˜ (39)
s.t.Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)≤ ℓ˜,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K (40)
=min
ℓ˜∈R
ℓ˜ (41)
s.t.Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+min
ℓˆa∈R
min
(ya∈Y,ℓa∈L)a∈A
ℓˆa ≤ ℓ˜,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K, (42)
where ℓˆ,ya, ℓa, ℓ˜ satisfies
βa(k)+ ℓa,F1 ≤ ℓˆa,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K,where F1 = ((k, /0)) (43)
∑
kt∈K
ℓa,Ft ≤ ℓa,Ft−1,∀a ∈ A,∀Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1,∀t = 2, . . . ,n,
where Ft = (Ft−1,(kt ,at−1)) (44)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)ya,It ≤ ℓa,Fn ,∀a ∈ A,Fn ∈ K
n×An−1,∀an ∈ A. (45)
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This is a nested LP. We will show that the optimal value of the embedded LP is
the same as the the optimal value of the following LP.
min
ℓ˜∈R
min
(ℓˆa∈R)a∈A
min
(ya∈Y,ℓa∈L)a∈A
ℓ˜ (46)
s.t.Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+ ℓˆa ≤ ℓ˜,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K, (47)
βa(k)+ ℓa,F1 ≤ ℓˆa,∀a ∈ A,k ∈ K,where F1 = ((k, /0)) (48)
∑
kt∈K
ℓa,Ft ≤ ℓa,Ft−1 ,∀a ∈ A,∀Ft ∈ K
t ×At−1,∀t = 2, . . . ,n,
where Ft = (Ft−1,(kt ,at−1)), (49)
n−1
∏
t=1
Qat (kt ,kt+1)
n
∑
t=1
Mkt (at , :)ya,It ≤ ℓa,Fn,∀a ∈ A,Fn ∈ K
n×An−1,∀an ∈ A. (50)
Let l˜∗,(lˆ∗a)a∈A,(y
∗
a)a∈A,(l
∗
a)a∈A be the optimal solution to (41-45), and l˜
+, (lˆ+a )a∈A,
(y+a )a∈A,(l
+
a )a∈A be the optimal solution to (46-50). We first show that l˜
∗ ≤ l˜+. Since
for any a ∈ A, lˆ+a ,y
+
a , l
+
a satisfy constraint (48-50), so wn(βa) ≤ lˆ
+
a for any a ∈ A.
Hence, we haveMk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :)βa+wn(βa)≤Mk(a, :)yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−Qa(k, :
)βa+ lˆ
+
a ≤ l˜
+ for any k ∈ K and a ∈ A. From equation (39-40), we see that l˜+ is a
feasible solution of (39-40), and l˜+ ≥ l˜∗.
Next, we show that l˜∗ ≥ l˜+. It is easy to see that (lˆ∗a)a∈A,(y
∗
a)a∈A,(l
∗
a)a∈A satisfy
constraint (48-50). Equation (42) impliesMka,:yˆ+ αˆ1(k)−∑k′∈KQ
a
k,k′
β k
′
a + lˆ
∗
a ≤ l˜
∗, for
any a ∈ A,k ∈ K, and hence l˜∗,(lˆ∗a)a∈A satisfies constraint (47). Therefore, (lˆ
∗
a)a∈A,
(y∗a)a∈A, (l
∗
a)a∈A is a feasible solution of LP (46-50), and l˜
∗ ≥ l˜+
Therefore, l˜∗ = l˜+, and the optimal values of LP (41-45) and LP (46-50) are the
same.
According to Proposition 3, (33-37) is true.
Now, we will give the detailed algorithm to compute the regret based security
strategy of the uninformed player in a primal game ΓN(p)
Algorithm 11.
1. Initialization
(a) Read payoff matrices M, transition matrices Q, time horizon N and initial
probability p.
(b) Set t = 1, and pt = p.
2. Compute the regret αˆ1 =−l
∗
1 at stage 1 by solving LP (26-28).
3. Compute the security strategy yˆ∗ and the regret candidate (β ∗a )a∈A by solving LP
(33-37) with n= N− t and αˆ1 = αˆt .
4. Draw an action in B according to yˆ∗, and read player 1’s action at .
5. Update t = t+ 1, and set αˆt = β
∗
at
.
6. If t ≤ N, go to step 3. Otherwise, end.
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Table 1 Transition matrices Qa of stochastic intrusion detection game
nv v nv v
nv 0.9 0.1 nv 0.8 0.2
v 0.1 0.9 v 0.2 0.8
Qhl Qll
Table 2 Payoff matrices Mk of stochastic intrusion detection game
a na a na
hl 3 -10 hl 3 -11
ll -1 0 ll -2 0
Mnv Mv
5 Case study: Asymmetric information stochastic intrusion detection game
Reference [1] introduced a stochastic intrusion detection game. In this game, an ad-
ministrator is assigned to protect a system from attacks. The administrator can do
either high level maintenance (hl) or low level maintenance (ll) at every time stage,
with A= {hl, ll}. If high level maintenance is done, the system is less vulnerable to
attacks. Otherwise, the system is more vulnerable to attacks. We indicate the state of
the system as vulnerable (v) or non-vulnerable (nv), i.e. K = {nv,v}. The transition
matrices are given in Table 1. The attacker decides whether to launch an attack (a)
or not (na) at every stage, i.e. B= {a,na}. The corresponding payoff of a vulnerable
system is always lower than the payoff of a non-vulnerable system, which is reflected
by the payoff matrices in Table 2. While in [1], it is assumed that the attacker knows
the original system state, we assume that the attacker cannot directly observe the sys-
tem state at any stage. Besides the transition matrices, payoff matrices and the initial
probability over the state, the attacker knows the administrator’s action at every stage.
But the payoff, or the actual influence due to the attack, is not known by the attacker.
We model this intrusion detection problem as an asymmetric information stochastic
game, and demonstrate our main results about history based and belief based security
strategies of informed player, and history based and regret based security strategies
of uninformed player in this model.
We set the time horizon N = 3 and the initial probability p0 = [0.5 0.5]. The
history based security strategy of the administrator (informed player) computed ac-
cording to Theorem 1 is given in the first two rows in Table 3, and the game value is
−3.4698. We, then, follow Algorithm 3 to compute the belief based security strategy
which is the same as the history based security strategy, and the updated belief of the
corresponding hAt is given in the last row of Table 3. This demonstrates Theorem 2
which says that the informed player has a security strategy that only depends on the
current stage and the current belief.
The history based security strategy of the attacker (uninformed player) computed
according to Theorem 9 is provided in the first row in Table 4, and the computed game
value is −3.4698 which meets the game value computed by the informed player. We
then compute the regret based security strategy of attacker according to Algorithm
11. The regret based security strategy is the same as the history based security strat-
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Table 3 Security strategy of informed player and belief update. Each element of the first two rows is
administrator’s security strategy σ∗Tt (kt ,It ). Each element of the last row is the belief p
T
t given informed
player’s security strategy σ∗ and history action It .
❍
❍
❍
❍
kt
It /0 1 2 1,1
nv 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
v 0.1875 0.8125 0.375 0.625 0.1356 0.8644 0.375 0.625
belief 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.1448 0.8552 0.8 0.2
❍
❍
❍
❍
kt
hAt 1,2 2,1 2,2
v 0 1 0 1 0 1
nv 0.133 0.867 0.375 0.625 0.1391 0.8609
belief 0.1135 0.8865 0.8 0.2 0.1836 0.8164
Table 4 Security strategy of uninformed player and regret update. Each element in the first row is informed
player’s security strategy τ∗Tt (It ), and each element in the last row is the regret αˆt given uninformed player
(attacker)’s security strategy τ∗ and informed player (administrator)’s history action It
hAt /0 1 2 1,1
τt 0.6657 0.3347 0.6617 0.3383 0.6617 0.3383 0.6875 0.3125
regret 3.1669 3.7729 0.9109 1.5038 0.7568 1.3498 0.2621 0.9496
hAt 1,2 2,1 2,2
τt 0.6875 0.3125 0.6875 0.3125 0.6875 0.3125
regret 0.0666 0.7541 0.2621 0.9496 0.0666 0.7541
egy, which demonstrate Corollary 2. The initial regret and updated regret given hAt is
provided in the last row of Table 4.
The security strategies of both players are then used in the intrusion detection
game. We considered 1000 realizations of the game, and compute the empirical aver-
age of the attacker’s payoff over those runs. This number,−3.4204, is comparable to
the computed value of the game, −3.4698, which demonstrates that the strategies of
both players shown in Table 3 and 4 achieves the game value, and hence are indeed
the security strategies of the corresponding players.
6 Conclusion and future work
This paper studied security strategies of both players in an asymmetric information
zero-sum two-player stochastic game in which only the informed player controls the
system state’s evolution. We showed that security strategies exist for the informed
player, which only depend on the belief, and can be computed by solving a linear
program whose size is linear in the cardinality of the uninformed player’s action set.
A similarly computationally attractive security strategy also exists for the uninformed
player, which only depends on a new object called ‘the regret’, which can itself be
efficiently computed at every step.
We are interested in extending this work to two-player Bayesian stochastic games
where both players have their own private types. The main foreseen challenge in
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Bayesian stochastic games is to find out sufficient statistics of both players.We expect
regret to play a role in this context as well, maybe in combination with a player’s
belief on its own type.
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